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Original Research Article
The value of sharing: Branding
and behaviour in a life and health
insurance company
Hugo Jeanningros1 and Liz McFall2
Abstract
As Big Data, the Internet of Things and insurance collide, so too, do the best and the worst of our futures. Insurance is
summoned as an example of the interference in our private lives that is already underway everywhere. In this paper,
we pause to reflect on this argument. Can changes in the way insurance measures the value of behaviour really serve as
an example of the individual and social harms of datafication? How do we know? Insurance is a mathematical relationship
staged between individuals and groups, between risk and uncertainty, between distribution and assessment, between the
value of sharing and the sharing of value. We use the case study of Discovery International, owner of Vitality, the market
leading brand in behavioural insurance to consider how behaviour is being branded and how the brand behaves.
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This article is a part of special theme on The Personalization of Insurance. To see a full list of all articles in this
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The important point is to make them click, that they
talk about it [. . .] We have to catch people, by the
coupons, by their friends who have points. (Generali
Vitality IV #1, 2017)
Introduction
How do you get people to talk about insurance, how
do you get them to publicly share their experience of
it and why would you want to? For most of its custom-
ers insurance is a dull necessity not the sort of thing
they are eager to have a conversation about. Besides
Wallace Stevens, the poet and underwriter for Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company, few have been
intrigued by the way the technical geometry of insur-
ance is orchestrated around the metaphysical dramas
that drive sales. Insurance is the best-known mecha-
nism for compensating loss, a product engineered to
restore value, a promise that the world can be set
right again even in the face of illness and death. This
much may be gleaned from centuries of marketing,
advertising and branding. It is harder to surface the
way this is part and parcel of the technical and com-
mercial practices of insurance. Generali Vitality want
their policyholders to talk, to share, precisely because
their product depends on maintaining a connection
between how the company values risk and how its cus-
tomers value insurance.
Getting to grips with how this connection works is
hard because despite insurance’s social importance and
sentimental resonance, its techniques are arcane. It is
well understood that technically, insurance concerns
the classification and distribution of risk, but precisely
how this is done is a highly niche form of expertise.
There is some general awareness that insurers employ
what, following Mackenzie (2011), might be called
‘canonical mechanisms’ that is, sets of knowledge
generating arrangements that facilitate actuarial
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calculations of risk, which are in turn factored into the
premium charged to consumers. Beyond this, a fog
surrounds precisely how insurers measure and cost
risk and how this is translated into the products and
prices offered to individual consumers. This fog has
become appreciably thicker with the arrival of new
techniques, data sources, products and market
entrants. These innovation surges have triggered atten-
tion from outside the sector – especially to products
incorporating telematics and health-tracking – but
little clarity about how insurance product innovations
work in practice.
Our paper is part of a move to remedy this by
delving deeper into the case of the most controversial
insurance product innovation – behaviour-based, or
interactive, health and life insurance. We focus on
Vitality, a brand wholly owned by the South African
financial services group Discovery Limited. Vitality is
delivered as a branded program, to individuals and
employer groups, through a network of equity, partner-
ship and franchise arrangements giving Vitality a pres-
ence in 19 countries and in the region of 17.8 million
customers (Discovery, 2018). Discovery was founded in
1992 and has focused on incorporating incentive-based
health promotion from the start. The company owns the
best-known brand in the field and has elaborated a
system of value-based practices and a socio-economic
philosophy to support it. The ‘Shared-Value Insurance’
model was developed in collaboration with academic
specialists in strategy, management and behavioural
economics (Porter and Kramer, 2001; Porter, Kramer
and Sesia, 2014). The model both underpins the general
principles of interactive incentive-based insurance and
drives specific product features, including the exhorta-
tion to customers to ‘share.’
We begin with a brief outline of the methods we
used to investigate Vitality’s business model. From
there we move on to identify how public concern
about the prospects of discrimination, exclusion and
surveillance, centre around the use of personalisation
strategies, individual-level data and individual pricing.
These are grim prospects, but their necessary debate
has been hampered by a recursive hype cycle between
consultancy reports, journalism and academic analyses
that confuse, and are confused by, the different cate-
gories of insurance, its idiomatic languages and
the byzantine regulatory and commercial contexts it
operates in. Health and life insurance are parastatal
industries. They operate in the spaces between supra-
national, national, federal, state, jurisdictional regula-
tion and policy on the one hand and between
consumer, employer and capital markets on the
other. Despite this, critical discussions seldom differen-
tiate between categories like life, health and even
motor, between individual and employer markets
or between different regulatory contexts. These
distinctions are inextricably related to how and why
behavioural data is used, shared and valued in insur-
ance. Added to this the vocabulary used to describe
insurance, particularly its emerging forms, is varied,
imprecise and unsettled. This allows attention to be
diverted to the most visible Internet of Things (IoT)-
based innovations and inhibits a more empirical, gran-
ular analysis of how insurance is changing and what the
implications of that might be.
Our two main empirical sections attempt a correc-
tion by explaining how the Vitality program works and
how it is sold in double-facing markets – both direct to
consumer or ‘B2C,’ and direct to group/employer,
known as ‘B2B.’ Establishing a space between these
two markets helps to expose two distinct but overlap-
ping senses in which Vitality’s program and products
can be understood as much as branding behaviour as
personalised risk assessment. In the first section,
BEHAVIOUR Branding, we describe how central indi-
vidual behaviour tracking is to the Vitality brand. In
the second section, BRANDING Behaviour, we focus
on how Discovery’s corporate efforts to protect and
maintain the Vitality brand are shaped by the regula-
tory and competitive contexts it trades in. In these two
sections we aim to establish a distinction between the
different health and life insurance markets and the dis-
tinct roles behavioural data sharing plays within them.
In both markets, behavioural data creates value for the
company but not necessarily because it provides a more
accurate ‘canonical mechanism’ for the actuarial calcu-
lation of individual level risk.
Methods and materials
Our aim is to investigate how behaviour-based insur-
ance is conducted at an industry level or ‘in the wild.’
To do so, we combine a variety of sources including
regulatory documents, grey literature, corporate web-
sites, consultancy blogs and primary interviews with
industry and regulatory professionals. The documents
from regulatory agencies, including the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK and the
European Union regulator, the European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), pro-
vide aggregated data on the uses of various kinds of
individual-level data in risk modelling and pricing prac-
tices across the sector. These insights allow us to con-
textualise the uses of self-tracking IoT-based data and
inform our argument that, despite its visibility, self-
tracking data is of marginal importance in the health
and life insurance sector. Regulatory documents reveal
concerns about how some individual level data acts as a
component of price, but it is not self-tracking data. We
combine analysis of these documents with evidence
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collected from interviews with 12 professionals
employed by insurance or data regulators, and insur-
ance national federations, including EIOPA, the
Directorate-General for Financial Stability (DG
FISMA) at the European Commission, and the
Commission Nationale de L’Informatique et des
Libertes (CNIL) in France, the authors of a
European Economic and Social Committee opinion
(EESC, 2017) and executives of the Federation
Française de L’assurance (FFA).
In order to assess the concrete modalities and tech-
nical practices of behaviour-based insurance, we con-
ducted 22 interviews with professionals employed by
European insurance and mutual insurance companies.1
Eleven of these interviews were with employees of
Vitality and Generali in positions ranging from prod-
uct design, marketing and program implementation
which allowed us to track the various steps of the prod-
uct from conception, selling, implementation to follow
up. The interviews were combined with documentary
analysis of grey literature, published reports; corporate,
partner, group/employer and consumer facing web-
sites; blogs and other online sources to provide our
case study. We focused primarily on Vitality branded
products sold in France, the US and the UK to give an
insight into how the way they are branded and employ
behavioural self-tracking schemes varies in accordance
with local regulation and health care policy.
Disentangling persons, data and pricing
John Hancock’s announcement in September 2018 that
it would no longer underwrite traditional life insurance
and instead offer only its Vitality branded interactive
health tracking policies broke through the usual disin-
terest in insurance stories to earn coverage in, among
others, The New York Times, The Washington Post,
Forbes, CNBC and the BBC. Behaviour-based pro-
grams in the health, life and motor sectors have
turned insurance into clickable media content and
drawn attention from a range of commentators and
scholars interested in the individual and social harms
digitalisation and datafication can do through surveil-
lance of individual-level and/or ‘behavioural’ data. The
use of new, and visibly material, devices like black box
telematics, wearables and apps has prompted concern
that insurance is becoming a world of ‘real-time rate
hikes and financial penalties’ (Zuboff, 2019: 215; see
also Krüger and Nı Bhroin, 2020; Lupton, 2016;
O’Neil, 2016; Schüll, 2016).
This prospect seems plausible given the affordances
of tracking devices and the data they gather. The ques-
tion we raise is whether we currently know enough
about insurance, and behavioural insurance specifi-
cally, to assess it. In critical discussions insurance is
usually cast in a supporting role, as one of many exam-
ples of the datafied, platform-based surveillance and
quantification of individuals (see Tanninen, 2020, this
issue). Journalistic2 and academic accounts rely heavily
on consultancy reports with titles like Disruption in the
Insurance Industry: here comes the Internet of Things
(IBM Institute 2017; see also AT Kearney, 2014;
McKinsey, 2019, 2016), which outline prospective
futures. There is a recursive loop that runs from these
reports to news articles to academic texts back to news
articles that all feeds into a hype cycle. A whole econ-
omy, as Pollock and Williams, have shown, springs
from industry analysis: ‘you know what is coming
next: because you are making it come next’ (2016: 3).
Analysts’ reports are suggestive, but they have an inter-
est in identifying what is coming next and are not a
reliable source on empirical practice in an arcane field.
The tendency to use consultancy reports as a primary
source may be understandable given the unobtrusive
and under-researched character of insurance but it ham-
pers publicly framed discussion of the issues raised by
behaviour-based products. In consequence characterisa-
tions of the present and future of behavioural underwrit-
ing, such as that offered in Zuboff’s (2019) analysis of
surveillance capitalism, seem clearer and more inevitable
than they are. In her account, insurers are using behav-
ioural underwriting as a means of reducing their risk
through machine processes that are designed to modify
behaviour by triggering financial penalties. In this, she
reiterates three main issues– the role of personalisation,
the use of individual health data and the emergence of
individual pricing – also raised in earlier work by
Lupton (2016), Neff and Nafus (2016), O’Neil (2016)
and Schüll (2016). These three issues are implicated in
behaviour-based products but there is a lack of clarity
about what each issue means in practice, about whether
they necessarily relate to one another and how. It does
not necessarily follow, for example, that personalisation
means personalised pricing, that the use of individual
data means IoT-derived health data or when it does it
that that impacts price. In what remains of this section,
we attempt to define more carefully how personalisa-
tion, individual data and pricing may be understood in
insurance practice.
First, personalisation. Personalisation conveys a sense
of both an offer made at the level of the individual and of
‘constant intimate surveillance’ of the same individual. It
is bound up with the emergence and ongoing refinement
of transactional history based offer and recommender
systems by supermarket loyalty schemes, online retailers
and digital streaming sites (Knox et al., 2010; Moor and
Lury, 2018; Seaver, 2015; Vargha, 2011) and it is an
inherently paradoxical concept. In combining the idea
of an offer for the person, made out of their (transac-
tional) history, personalisation appears to be all about
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the person as a distinct and unique individual. As a com-
mercial process however, personalisation involves
extracting and combining multiple data points into a
dynamic series of re-contextualised recommendations
and offers. As Seaver characterises it:
Personalized recommender systems were once pitched
as a fine-grained improvement on coarse demographic
targeting . . . the new generation of contextual recom-
menders appeals to the partible person: your likes,
and maybe even your identity, may vary according to
the situations you find yourself in. Given these trends
in recommender research and development, we are in
for a future where data mining concerns itself increas-
ingly with the determination of context, drawing on a
range of signals to personalize more precisely than the
unified ‘person.’ (2015: 1103).
Contextual recommender systems illustrate a tension
that has been there along between personalisation as
a strategy and ideas about the person, as a single quan-
tity of human, upon whom a strategy can intrude.
Strategies of ‘mass personalisation’ (Vargha, 2011) do
not so much intrude on the person as summon an
entirely different construct, a person mobilised, tempo-
rarily, dynamically and contextually, only for the
purposes of making a market offer. In historical and
anthropological terms, as Mauss (1985) reasoned,
making the ‘person’ equivalent to a single quantity of
human is a quirk. In most times and in most places, the
notion of ‘person’ is the outcome of technical and lim-
ited processes, ‘formulated only for us, among us’
(1985: 22). The person health and life insurance surveils
is not so much a whole human individual as a notion, a
category, that from an aggregate of data points can
classify an individual as a body belonging to a risk
group (c.f. Van Hoyweghen, 2013; Van Hoyweghen
and Prainsack, 2020; McFall and Moor, 2018).
Behavioural insurance fits with the notion of a
‘tracking-intensive world’ in which the person can be
sliced, divided and treated as data (Schüll, 2016: 327).
Data, Cheney-Lippold (2017) remarks, is mobilised in
technology discourse as a way of expressing the human
condition directly and used by companies with obliga-
tion to tell us how they make ‘us.’ This fuels dread –
and fascination – with commercial surveillance that is
evident in responses to behavioural insurance, of the
‘endless trapdoors ahead: data inaccuracies, intentional
gaming, constant intimate surveillance 24/7.’3 The chal-
lenge in resisting incursion into the private territory of
human experience is to avoid promoting the conceit
that datafied personalisation can see deeper than it can.
Self-tracking devices promise a peculiarly intimate
way of seeing the person, a deep body periscope.
Where a traditional insurance assessment may use
body-mass-index calculations or ask questions about
fitness, risky habits and occupations, self-tracking
data seems to offer an almost unmediated assessment.
The devices are themselves very visible, their incorpo-
ration into insurance a tangible sign that individual,
behavioural data is being used. The problem is first,
in the hop, skip and jump from the incorporation of
self-tracking devices to the use of the data they gather
for real-time risk assessment and pricing and second, in
the way this diverts attention from the role being
played by other forms of individual data. The visibility
of wearables begs comparison with more established
black box, telematic motor insurance schemes. Since
both track forms of movement using black boxed algo-
rithmic devices and/or smartphone apps it is easy to
treat them as having broadly comparable affordances
for insurance. Although they remain a relatively small
proportion of the market, telematic motor insurance
schemes do track driving for specific risks and the
data they gather triggers penalties, bonuses and
informs price (Meyers, 2018; Meyers and Van
Hoyweghen, 2018, 2020). This makes motor telematics
something of an outlier in price personalisation,
as Moor and Lury (2018: 507) note, few cases feature
‘the kind of transparency about the linking of price to
personhood that is present (at least to some degree) in
‘black box’ insurance policies for young drivers.’ It is
not at all clear that anything equivalent is likely in the
health and life sectors given the categorical differences
between health and driving as risk objects and the very
different regulatory restrictions that apply.
While public attention has focused primarily on
health tracking data, all sorts of other individual-
level data have quietly begun to be used in insurance
pricing. In 2019 the European Union regulator,
EIOPA, conducted a thematic review of how Big
Data analytics were being used across insurance sectors
(See Figure 1). Their review emphasised the increasing
role played by ‘alternate’ or ‘external’ data, a category
which includes but is certainly not limited to, telematic
and wearable data. Traditional data includes demo-
graphic, exposure (e.g. type of vehicle, value of con-
tents) and, to a lesser extent, behavioural (e.g.
smoking, drinking, distance) data. External data
includes a wide range of data – for example IoT data,
online data and financial data – that are called ‘exter-
nal’ because they are not modelled as actuarial risk
factors. As in all Big Data epistemologies, external
data analysis is based on correlation and its capacity
to expose strange connections – owners of orange cars
make fewer insurance claims, regular dentist visits are a
reasonable proxy for high credit scores – without the
need to identify a causal mechanism.
The use of external data was also a target of the
UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 2019
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investigation into insurance pricing practices. The FCA
noted that firms use between 50 and 400 factors in their
pricing models. Among these, a growing number have
no identified, causal connection to actuarially modelled
risk. Thus, for example, the price offered may be influ-
enced by individual level data on online purchase his-
tories (including what, when, where and by what means
items are purchased); social media, internet or mobile
activity; geographic location tracking; the condition or
type of device, operating systems and applications used
to access the internet; and specific patterns of website
behaviour. Regulators in Europe, the UK and the US
all recognise that these data can produce unfair and
discriminatory outcomes that contravene statutory lim-
itations on discrimination and exceed the permitted
actuarial exceptions for discrimination, for example
on the grounds of age.4 In the US, insurance is regu-
lated primarily at state level, with some legal protec-
tions including the prohibition of discrimination on the
grounds of pre-existing conditions, effective at federal
level (McFall, 2019). New York’s state insurance regu-
lator advised insurers in 2019 of their statutory obliga-
tions to ensure data sources are not based in any way
on ‘race, color, creed, national origin, status as a victim
of domestic violence, past lawful travel or sexual ori-
entation.’ They accordingly cautioned insurers against
using:
external data sources, algorithms or predictive models
in underwriting or rating unless the insurer has deter-
mined that the processes do not collect or utilize pro-
hibited criteria and that the use of the external data
sources, algorithms or predictive models are not unfair-
ly discriminatory. The insurer must establish that the
external data sources, algorithms or predictive models
are based on sound actuarial principles with a valid
explanation or rationale for any claimed correlation
or causal connection. (New York State Department
of Financial Services, 2019)
This advice marks the many different ways external
consumer data decreases transparency and increases
the scope for discrimination. This is data that is already
used in insurance pricing in ways that are almost
completely opaque to customers. There is growing
awareness of some pricing practices, for example, the
prevalence of loyalty penalties in the UK, whereby cus-
tomers who stay longest with their insurers pay the
most (FCA, 2019) but other prevalent datafied pricing
practices have attracted much less attention. Price opti-
misation, for example, uses external data to assess ‘cus-
tomers’ propensity to purchase, renew or buy ancillary
products or services’ and how much they might be will-
ing to pay (FCA, 2019: 23; Minty, 2016). Individual
level consumer sentiment might be gauged on a real-
time basis from, for example, whether a price compar-
ison or other distribution channel was used, whether
the terms and conditions were read and how much time
was spent doing so, what time of day the search was
conducted, what sites or sources are consulted before
purchase and so on (EIOPA, 2019).
Insurance prices emerge somewhere in the collision
between actuarial risk and non-risk factors. Figure 2
describes something of the range of insurance price
components. Under expected claims cost are the actu-
arial rating factors used to calculate risk. That includes
individual behavioural data, like smoking and drink-
ing, but does not generally include behavioural data
derived from IoT devices. EIOPA’s review collected
feedback from 222 insurers across 28 jurisdictions. Of
these around 20 health insurance firms said they were
using data from wearable devices and mobile phone
Figure 1. EIOPA internal and external data sources.
Source: EIOPA, 2019.
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apps but primarily for product development, sales and
distribution.
The other area where individual behavioural data
has a major effect on price falls under expenses, espe-
cially the costs of acquisition. Historically advertising,
promotion and sales would be the major costs, (c.f.
McFall, 2014) but this has changed with the move to
online purchasing. In the online environment discount-
ing for new customers and price optimisation strategies
are a substantial part of the cost to acquire. Optimising
price to entice new customers creates acquisition costs
that are borne by all customers. The result is that the
most brand loyal customers subsidise the cost of the
newest, least brand loyal and most price sensitive cus-
tomers. The individual behavioural data with the most
significant impact on price is the data used to assess
propensity to buy.
This still accounts for a relatively small part of price.
Another detail usually missed in the behavioural data
debate is that underwriting is not the primary source of
insurance profit. The provision of additional services
such as premium finance has become increasingly sig-
nificant in recent years (FCA, 2019) but as far back as
the nineteenth century a substantial part of insurance
profit has been derived from investment income
(Ericson et al., 2000; McFall, 2014). Research by Van
der Heide (2019) has delved further into insurers’
investment practices and revealed how substantially
the way insurers evaluate the economic worth of their
contracts has changed since the 1970s. Van der Heide’s
analysis traces how the privatisation or ‘individualisa-
tion’ of risk and responsibility that underpinned the
rolling back of welfare provision from the 1980s
(Baker and Simon, 2002; O’Malley, 1996) was also
instantiated in concrete insurance practices and
arrangements. In traditional life insurance, he explains,
policyholder benefits were related to investment
income, but risk was borne by the company as a
whole, not by individual policyholders. The emergence
of unit-linked insurance, which dominated the life
sector by 2010, tied policyholder benefits directly to
financial market performance. The result is that insur-
ance contracts have become more like other investment
and financial instruments (c.f. Christophers et al., 2018)
in which the cost of financial risk is charged directly to
the individual. From this perspective it is not so much
the personalisation of risk but its individualisation that
has had the most impact on pricing.
In the two sections that follow, we give an overview
of how Vitality operates in ‘double-facing markets’ that
present ‘B2C’ an offer to individual consumers and/or
a ‘B2B’ offer to business/groups/employers. In the first
section, BEHAVIOUR branding, we argue that behav-
iour is Vitality’s central brand value and trace its role,
particularly in the B2C market. In the next section,
BRANDING behaviour, we document how developing
and protecting this brand value has informed
Discovery’s corporate strategy and its B2B offer.
BEHAVIOUR branding: The Vitality
program
As the market leader Vitality provides important
insight into the implementation of self-tracking pro-
grams in health and life insurance. Discovery Limited
is a South African financial services group, focused pri-
marily on insurance. The company was founded in
1992 by Adrian Gore in a national context composed
of an underfunded, public health care system and
expensive private provision (Porter, Kramer and
Figure 2. The components of price (FCA, 2019).
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Sesia, 2014). By the end of the decade Discovery was
the largest health insurer in South Africa, had
embarked on an international expansion programme
and had launched Vitality. Vitality was conceived as
a health promotion program designed around a
system of financial and non-financial incentives and
rewards. It was based on the proposition that healthier
behaviour would lower rates of health care consump-
tion allowing the insurer to lower the price of cover and
finance rewards (Gore, 2018).
Vitality soon became Discovery’s main product and
the centrepiece of the company’s international expan-
sion in the early 2000s. It was implemented in the UK
in 2004 through a joint venture with Prudential
Assurance, once the UK’s largest insurance company
with a long track record in group health and pensions.
The scheme was marketed under the umbrella of
PruHealth as a ‘unique way of rewarding you for
actively looking after your health throughout the
year’ (French and Kneale, 2009: 1041). This predated
the proliferation of self-tracking devices and apps in
the 2010s. Initially, Vitality points were awarded for
activities including participating in a smoking cessation
programme, visiting a gym, shopping for fresh fruit
and vegetables, completing regular health screens,
and demonstrating improvements in BMI and blood
pressure (French and Kneale, 2009). The novelty of
the scheme was complemented by promotional devices
like the ‘help yourself’ to an orange or a tennis ball bus-
stop in Figure 3.
The joint venture with Prudential ended in 2014.
Discovery now operates the Vitality scheme through
the subsidiary brand names Vitality Health Insurance,
Vitality Life Insurance and Vitality Invest alongside a
network of partnership arrangements. In the last
decade Discovery has reached around 17.8 million
customers in 19 countries through arrangements
including a 2010 equity partnership with Ping An in
China; a 2013 partnership with AIA operating in
Australia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, South-
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam
and Philippines; partnerships in the US initially with
Humana then through a 2016 partnership with John
Hancock; a 2016 partnership with Generali operational
in France, Germany and Austria; a 2016 arrangement
with Manulife Canada and most recently a 2018 part-
nership with Sumitomo Life in Japan.
There is a lot of variation in the Vitality offer across
these settings – in some it is health insurance, in some
life, in others both; it may be sold direct to consumers,
to employers, or both. In the US, John Hancock sells
Vitality branded life policies direct to individuals
through a partnership arrangement while Discovery’s
US subsidiary, Vitality Group, sells health insurance
direct to employers and through brokers; Vitality UK
sells health insurance direct to employers, and both
health and life insurance direct to individuals; in
France the Generali–Vitality partnership sells only to
employers.
Despite the variety of product and distribution
mechanisms, the central brand value is always behav-
iour. The program has a common core around three
main phases that are customised locally: behavioural
assessment, improvement and reward. In France,
Generali–Vitality expresses the core reflectively –
‘se connaı̂tre, s’ameliorer, profiter’ Know yourself;
Improve yourself; Enjoy.5 In the UK, this is rendered
as ‘Understand your health, Get healthier, Be
rewarded’ while the US has it as Assess, Improve,
Track, Reward.6 The first step centres on completing
health checks and reviews. These include standard
health assessments including BMI, waist-hip ratio,
Figure 3. PruHealth bus-stop campaign, JC Decaux.
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blood pressure, cholesterol and blood sugar combined
with the Vitality Health Review of individual nutrition
and wellness habits, vaccinations, dental and cancer
screenings. Vitality points are awarded for completing
each of these actions. On the basis of these reviews,
customers are advised of their ‘Vitality age’ presented
as a ‘scientific calculation that assesses the impact of
your lifestyle on your health.’7
To access program rewards, members have to accu-
mulate points to obtain one of four or five status posi-
tions variously labelled as blue, bronze, silver, gold,
platinum, diamond, etc. Completing reviews and
checks earns initial points, but the core of the program
is Improve your health. This is where sharing behaviou-
ral data starts to acquire value. Members can still earn
points from activities like going to the gym by report-
ing proof online. Increasingly though, the focus is on
the accumulation of points by self-tracking variables
such as blood pressure, blood sugar, weight, heart
rate and especially physical activity using wearable
devices, smartphones and apps. To accommodate dif-
ferent sorts of activity, the program defines a valid
workout according to criteria including duration,
heart rate, calories burnt, step counts and average
speed (see Figure 4).
By earning points, Vitality members improve their
status and unlock rewards that again, vary locally. In
the majority of territories, the rewards are discounts on
sports goods, groceries, hotels, cinemas, Starbucks,
Amazon and the flagship reward, a heavily discounted
Apple Watch. The most controversial rewards are pre-
mium rebates. Rebates, expressed in the UK Vitality
program as ‘the more points you earn, the higher your
Vitality status, the bigger the rewards and the lower your
premium can be,’ are a core part of the offer in British,
South African and North American contexts.8 They are
notably absent in other many territories.
This absence appears rooted in both regulatory pro-
hibitions and market resistance. In France, for exam-
ple, the use of individual tariffs in health insurance is
explicitly prohibited under the Loi Évin enacted in 1989
while in Germany premium discounts or paybacks are
possible but the regulatory structure of the private
insurance market prohibits regular, dynamic,
behaviour-based risk-rating (Arentz and Rehm,
2016). In the US, some companies trading in individual
markets offer rewards but not premium discounts as
this would contravene Obamacare regulations prohib-
iting price discrimination on the grounds of pre-
existing conditions (McFall, 2019). The situation is
more complicated in group health, where employers
can negotiate premium discounts for introducing self-
tracking but even then it is a group not an individual
discount that is at stake. It is worth noting too that
even where premium discounts are not explicitly pro-
hibited by law, regulations governing, for example,
cross-subsidy between high and low risk members,
can limit insurers’ economic incentive for adopting
them. Social and political resistance is a significant
impediment especially in territories with social
insurance-based universal healthcare. It is probably
not incidental that the Vitality program features pre-
mium discounts in the US and South Africa, countries
without universal healthcare systems, and in the UK
where the National Health Service (NHS) is tax not
insurance funded and private health insurance is, at
around ten per cent, comparatively rare.
Market resistance, in a cautious and reputation sen-
sitive industry, is a related impediment. In France,
Generali–Vitality declined to launch the product in
Figure 4. Vitality points for activity tracking.14
8 Big Data & Society
direct to consumer markets and packaged it to employ-
er markets as a social responsibility solution to mitigate
reputational damage (Generali Vitality IV #2, 2018).
Major insurers have not taken the view that self-
tracking data can price individual health risk more
accurately (EIOPA, 2019; McCrea and Farrell, 2018).
Even if they did come to believe in individual risk
modelling it is still uncertain that any efficiency gains
would offset the associated infrastructural expenses
and reputational costs (c.f. Swedloff, 2015).
If there is no clear margin in individual risk model-
ling it raises the question of why Vitality places such
emphasis on individual behaviour. One answer to this
lies in the importance of cultivating market or brand
attachment in insurance (Cochoy et al., 2016).
Historically, companies have invested heavily in pro-
motional marketing to overcome disinterest and resis-
tance. Initially this usually involved some combination
of ‘explaining’ their technical approach to risk and
exploiting sentiment, especially fear and shame. In
the twentieth century, beginning with the ‘man from
the Prudential’ (McFall, 2011, 2014), this involved cul-
tivating a specific brand identity. Most insurers have
struggled with this: brand loyalty, recognition and dif-
ferentiation are all low in a sector that is heavily reliant
on price competition where there is annual renewal and
customer inertia where there isn’t. There is then some
competitive advantage to having a distinctive set of
attributes to build a brand identity around. Making
behaviour a central brand value sets Vitality apart.
It is interesting too that Vitality has chosen internation-
ally renowned brands including Starbucks, Amazon
and Apple as reward partners. Apple is widely reck-
oned the world’s most valuable brand and its custom-
ers are loyal to the point of fandom. In partnering with
Apple to offer a discounted Apple Watch, Vitality
Figure 5. Vitality Apple Watch Series 5 offer.15
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might expect to accrue some benefits by association but
there is more at stake. The capacity to provoke a par-
ticular version of healthy behaviour is as much at the
core of the Apple Watch as it is of Vitality.
Consider the detailed terms of Vitality’s 2019 Apple
Watch Series 5 offer to individual markets in the UK
shown in Figure 5. The right-hand columns contrast
the RRP with the Vitality price and reveal a potential
saving of around £300. This saving can be achieved by
members who accumulate 160 points per month over
24months. The scale slides down in four phases to
members who accumulate less than 40 points and will
pay the full RRP by direct debit.9
Vitality points are a behavioural currency. They can
be earned through activity and exchanged for goods
discounted in line with a dynamic exchange rate. To
earn enough Vitality currency to pay for the watch in
full you need 160 activity points per month. This aver-
ages out at roughly 5.33 points per day which can be
earned by taking just over 10000 steps, 30–59 exercise
minutes at 60% maximum heart rate, or a parkrun, etc.
To meet monthly targets, every month, demands active
behaviour in excess of WHO guidelines but failing to
do so increases the cost of goods exchanged.
Wearable devices do not determine behaviour, wear-
ers play around with them, forget them and discard
them (Neff and Nafus, 2016; Tanninen, 2020). The
Apple Watch can claim to be ‘stickier’ than its compet-
itors having acquired 55% of the smartwatch market
by 2019.10 It is a socio-technical attaching device that is
fairly successful at seducing and capturing or ‘captat-
ing’ its users and algorithmically gaming them into
closing activity circles with an ambient interface
wrapped in Apple packaging (Callon, 2016; Cochoy
et al., 2016). It fits Vitality perfectly not only because
of the Apple brand allure but because it is the best
available means for provoking the kind of behaviour
the company has a proprietary stake in.
BRANDING behaviour: Discovery’s
business model
In February 2015, the South African newspaper
Business Day published an unremarkable looking
story about Discovery.
Discovery has partnered with a major US life insurer to
launch products developed on the Vitality model in
April. The US insurer, which Discovery has not yet
named, will launch a suite of products similar to
those of Discovery Life in SA. [. . .] Discovery said it
had ended its partnership with US health insurance
partner for Vitality, Humana. “Humana will continue
with Vitality as we built it with them but change its
name.” said Mr Gore. (Jones, 2015)
What this story does not say directly is that the part-
nership with Humana, one of the US’s largest insurers
with a major stake in the group/employer market,11
under which Humana acquired a quarter of
Discovery’s US subsidiary, Vitality Group, had ended
badly. The Adrian Gore quote just insinuates his posi-
tion that Humana had taken advantage of the partner-
ship to repackage Vitality as their own brand Go365.12
The experience with Humana changed Discovery’s
approach to building international partnerships and
the company afterwards adopted a much more protec-
tive attitude to its intellectual property (Vitality Group,
2018: 18). It no longer sells the program to partners:
instead it co-designs local iterations with them. As a
Generali Vitality employee put it:
It’s at the heart of their intellectual capital, it’s what
they sell [. . .] it’s their exclusive right, there are no other
programs, so that is something they really don’t want
to share [. . .] The product is 90% theirs, the actuarial
heart of the product, it’s them, our part was more
about marketing. (Generali Vitality IV #3, 2018 our
translation)
Discovery’s proprietorial attitude to the Vitality pro-
gram and brand is situated in the broader contexts of
its corporate history and the regulatory policy context
it was developed in. When Gore founded the company
South Africa had five times the disease burden of the
US, a third of its doctors per capita, and epidemic
levels of HIV/AIDS (Porter, Kramer and Sesia,
2014). The country had – and still has – two, racially
stratified, healthcare systems. In 2011, South Africa’s
General Household Survey reported the chronically
underfunded public system as the primary source of
healthcare for 85% of the population, used by 81%
of black South Africans and 63% of coloured South
Africans (Davis, 2013). The remainder used medical
insurance and/or out of pocket (OOP) payment to
fund private health care.13 Discovery’s corporate histo-
ry cites this context as informing the principles behind
Gore’s solution to the problem of funding healthcare.
This is a global problem that can be characterised, very
generally, as one of ensuring universal access to ade-
quate quality, affordable health care for growing,
aging, sicker populations. Locally, health care funding
and payment, problems and solutions, are bewildering-
ly various.
Annual reports and published corporate histories
locate Gore’s idea for Vitality in the plural contexts
of South African health care, his experience as an actu-
ary working in product development and his reading of
10 Big Data & Society
behavioural economics. The Harvard case study pro-
duced by Michael Porter, Mark Kramer and Aldo
Sesia reports:
In late 1997, Gore launched Vitality to the broker com-
munity. Built on the principles of behavioural econom-
ics, Vitality encouraged sustained behavior change by
offering individuals a combination of knowledge tools
(information about health), access to wellness partners
(e.g., fitness clubs), and financial incentives that
increased proportionally as members engaged with
the program. In accord with South African law,
Vitality was offered separately from Discovery
Health’s medical schemes for a monthly fee that cov-
ered the cost of the program. Membership was volun-
tary, but only members of a Discovery medical scheme
could join Vitality. (Porter, Kramer and Sesia, 2014: 4)
The Harvard case study is a mythological and method-
ological genre all on its own (Ortiz and Muniesa, 2017).
Discovery Case Number 9-715-423 is a good example
of how corporate reports mix ‘narrative and numbers’
(Froud et al., 2006) to bait and switch their audiences’
attention. It would take forensic accounting and foren-
sic epidemiology to factcheck the claims within it and
we haven’t tried. We are instead trying to find a path
through the many stories that could be told about how
Discovery developed its branding behaviour. There was
likely some financial currency exchange involved in the
production of Case Number 9-715-423. Porter and col-
leagues are not ‘disinterested’ observers in the financial
sense. They are also, simultaneously, ‘interested’
observers in the intellectual sense. Discovery is a
lively methodological test of the value-chain and
behavioural economic theories that Porter, Kramer
and Sesia have spent decades working on. In short,
there is a mixed, blurry exchange of financial and intel-
lectual value between Porter and his colleagues that
informs Discovery’s branding behaviour. This relation-
ship is also in play in global, cultural and political
economy exchanges conducted, for example, at the
World Economic Forum (WEF) where Gore has
been a participant. In a WEF blog post, Gore remarks
on Discovery’s finding ‘that a shared-value model,
where incentives drive better behaviour and where
cost savings from this improved behaviour fund the
incentives, had a dramatic impact on people’s choices’
(Gore, 2018).
The theoretical claim that people can be gently
nudged away from chronic, preventable, lifestyle-
related disease toward better, healthier behaviour
rooted in behavioural economics is the practical basis
of the Vitality program. This is combined with Michael
Porter’s value-chain theory to create the two main
characteristics of Discovery’s shared-value model.
The first is that corporate social responsibility (CSR)
cannot transform relationships between corporate
finance, government, global societies and individual
people, these relationships have to be completely
remodelled. The second is that nudging individuals,
businesses and institutions to ‘share’ value will help
achieve that transformation.
The word ‘share’ here is doing a lot of work. It
invokes, first, centrist, liberally paternalist politics
and a new socio-political ‘insurantial imaginary’ mobi-
lised through behavioural underwriting. It is an almost
poetic paradox that Francois Ewald – the intellectual
architect of Foucauldian approaches to socialised
insurance, welfare solidarity and risk – has endorsed
this new datafied imaginary (Ewald, 1986, 2012;
Ewald and Thourot, 2013). Second, it invokes sharing
individual health data. Finally, it invokes sharing in the
social media vernacular.
These last two forms of sharing are integral to the
Vitality brand, but they have been difficult to accom-
plish in practice. One element of the John Hancock
story that gets lost in translation is that their move to
underwriting only interactive life policies means they
sell only products that have this feature. This is akin
to Apple bundling its proprietary apps in every IoS
device. The features are there, but the company
cannot force its customers to use them. We do not
know the percentage of John Hancock’s customers
that are active users of the Vitality program. In the
Generali Vitality version, the interactive feature is
opt-in for all members but only 20% activate it
(Vitality IV#4 2019). This statistic makes it that bit
harder for agents and brokers to close the sale.
Insurance sales agents have long been taught that
sales cannot be closed by reason alone. As Prudential
Assurance once informed its agents through the words
of Oliver Wendell Holmes ‘reason may be the lever but
sentiment is the fulcrum and the place to stand on if
you want to move the world.’ In a datafied environ-
ment the lever may be better described as ‘technique,’
meaning an assembly of practice, expertise and tech-
nology. At the point of sale in Generali Vitality this
lever has to connect with ‘subjectivity, there are emo-
tions, sometimes it’s no longer rational, we completely
take off’ (Vitality IV#4 2019, our translation). The
phrase we have translated as ‘take off’ is ‘on decolle.’
There is no easy equivalent in English, but it means to
have a head in the sky, perhaps to soar. The sales trick
is in orchestrating reason and sentiment, keeping both
balls in the air.
Provoking individual customers/members to share
self-tracking health data on social media is another ele-
ment of Vitality’s branding behaviour. This is meant to
allow the labour of promotion to be distributed
(shared) between the company and its customers and
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‘increase customer engagement and the number of
interactions between the insurer and insured’ (Krüger
and Nı Bhroin, 2020: 100). Generali Vitality’s custom-
ers have not developed the kind of attachment to the
brand that might prompt posting their experience on
social media.
People often say to us ‘well well, again, something for
the bosses, they always find new things to try to make
us more productive.’ (Generali Vitality IV #4, 2019 our
translation)
This all points to the importance of the Vitality pro-
gram as branding behaviour. Even if customers are
reluctant to share their Vitality experience publicly, to
‘click and talk about it’ (Generali Vitality IV #1, 2017)
they are almost certain to have more interactions, more
engagement and more attachment to the brand than is
typical of insurance customers. This doesn’t necessarily
mean that individual health risk assessment is irrele-
vant -it means that the commercial value of behaviou-
ral schemes need not be based on using the data for
fine-grained risk assessment. The Vitality program may
work just by mobilising self-tracking, rewards and
Apple Watches to create a brand that is ‘stickier’
than its competitors. Since customers drop in and out
of the program, in the same way they do with self-
tracking devices and apps more generally (Neff and
Nafus, 2016; Tanninen, 2020), the data they gather is
skewed accordingly. This raises questions about wheth-
er self-tracking data is clinically, epidemiologically and
actuarially reliable enough to assess or price individual
health risk.
Closing remarks
[H]ow do these needs for production and consumption
– for sale and purchase – which have just been mutually
satisfied by a trade concluded thanks to conversation
arise? Most often, thanks again to conversations, which
had spread the idea of a new product to buy or to
produce from one interlocutor to another, and, along
with this idea, had spread trust in the qualities of the
product or in its forthcoming output, and finally the
desire to consume it or to manufacture it. If the public
never conversed, the spreading of merchandise would
almost always be a waste of time and the hundred
thousand advertising trumpets would sound in vain.
(Tarde in Latour and Lepinay, 2009: 49)
One of the most interesting things about insurance is
that it’s not interesting. People generally don’t want to
talk about it or share their experiences of it. Its arcane
techniques are under-researched across the social scien-
ces and attract little public attention despite their social
and political importance and the sentimental charge of
loss. There is little public understanding of how insur-
ers measure and cost risk and how this is translated
into the products and prices offered to individual con-
sumers. This state of affairs has not been improved by
recent conversations sparked by the emergence of new
techniques, data sources, products and market entrants
that appear to portend a surveillance apparatus of
behaviour-based personalisation, the appropriation of
individual data and individualised risk pricing. The
problem is that the role and consequences of insurance
innovations cannot really be gauged outside of the tech-
nical and commercial practices of insurance companies
and the regulatory environments they operate in.
To demonstrate this, we used a case study of
Vitality, the longest established and best-known
brand in the field of behaviour-based or interactive
insurance. Vitality are known for promoting wearable
based self-tracking through a system of incentives and
rewards, notably the offer of a heavily discounted
Apple Watch. This scheme, and its prominent incorpo-
ration of wearable devices, has been widely read as a
sign that health and life insurance is going the way of
telematics schemes in vehicle insurance, to individualise
premia based on tracked behaviour. We suggest that
such an outcome is much easier to accomplish in theory
than it is in practice. Risk pricing in insurance is an
arcane technical practice conducted in a highly regulat-
ed and competitive market context. Even if self-
tracking data was to be modelled as a pricing factor
it is not clear that there would be sufficient incentive for
insurers to use it given the regulatory environment,
infrastructural expenses and reputational costs of
doing so. There are also reasons to be sceptical about
the clinical and actuarial reliability of self-tracking data
and the devices and apps used to gather it. Insurance
industry actors don’t know how to risk assess the
health of individual human beings – they know how
to risk assess aggregates, groups, collectives, pools,
populations.
Given these impediments what value does behaviou-
ral self-tracking have for companies like Discovery? We
suggest the answer to this lies in the inextricable con-
nections between risk pricing as a technical practice
and the commercial organisation of the sentimental
appeal insurance makes to its customers. It is as one
nineteenth century writer put it ‘the judgement with
which lives are selected, and the premiums improved
at interest’ (Porter, 1996: 102), not just the rates at
which risk are priced, that determines an insurance
office’s success. The Vitality program should be under-
stood in the context of Discovery’s broader corporate
and commercial judgement. It provides a means of
reaching – or selecting – the type of customers the com-
pany wants to insure and nudging them to behave in
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ways that lower their costs to the company. Through
Vitality, Discovery Inc. have made a brand out of
behaviour in ways that can be traced in the corporate
history of their own branding behaviour and their
attempts to protect their intellectual property. The
value of sharing lies in maintaining, through the
Vitality brand, a lively exchange, a conversation, that
maintains the connection between how the company
values risk and how its customers value insurance.
Acknowledgements
The paper found its way to publication through the collective
and solidaristic chat among a group of insurance scholars
especially Ine Van Hoyweghen, Gert Meyers, Arjen van der
Heide, Maiju Tanninen, Rick Swedloff, Jim Davey and all the
contributors to this themed issue. We are particularly grateful
to the three anonymous referees for their help in refining our
excitable arguments.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iDs
Hugo Jeanningros https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1736-5295
Liz McFall https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8681-2576
Notes
1. Interviews were conducted in French by one of the
authors.
2. See for example, www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/
2018/09/21/insurance-wearables-and-the-future-of-health
care/#5af7c2751782; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/
19/your-money/john-hancock-vitality-life-insurance.
html; https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/your-money/
giving-out-private-data-for-discount-in-insurance.html?
module=inline.#; www.forbes.com/sites/conniegu
glielmo/2014/02/12/the-case-against-wearables/
#6492e62a4fd0; www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/
06/19/wearable-tech-health-insurance/#2d5153718bd5
3. As Kate Crawford tweeted following the John Hancock
announcement, accessible at https://twitter.com/katecraw
ford/status/104255839 6497649664
4. See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/
en/MEMO_11_123; Edmunds (2015).
5. Our translation. See https://www.generalivitality.fr/vmp/
comment_fonctionne_vitality
6. See www.vitality.co.uk/rewards/ https://www.vitali
tygroup.com/how-vitality-works/
7. See www.vitality.co.uk/rewards/
8. See www.vitality.co.uk/rewards/partners/activity-track
ing (accessed 18 May 2020).
9. See www.vitality.co.uk/rewards/partners/active-rewards/
apple-watch (accessed 1 October 2019).
10. This share is despite having only 28.9% of the smart-
phone market. See www.wareable.com/smartwatches/
smartwatch-market-q1-2020-share-winners-7966
11. HumanaVitality Wellness was sold to Humana in 2014.
On Humana’s position in the US health payer market.
See www.beckershospitalreview.com/payer-issues/ameri
ca-s-largest-health-insurers-in-2018.html
12. See www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160414005954/
en/HumanaVitality-Renames-Wellness-Rewards-
Program-Go365-Plans; www.pressreader.com/south-
africa/business-day/20150226/281535109440802 s
13. Davis (2013) has 88% White South Africans and 64%
Indian South Africans as the primary users of private
health care.
14. See www.vitality.co.uk/rewards/partners/activity-track
ing (accessed 18 May 2020).
15. See www.vitality.co.uk/rewards/partners/active-rewards/
apple-watch (accessed 1 October 2019).
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